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I Randomization and Intention-to-Treat Estimator
Consistent estimates of the treatment eect parameter of interest can be obtained by ran-
domization of treatment. Treatment randomization, however, is rarely implemented in practice
because it implies that the treatment must be provided to the participant, regardless of what
he/she wishes. Researchers thus generally resort to the randomization of eligibility to treat-
ment.
What can be estimated with eligibility randomization is the intention-to-treat (ITT) es-
timator. It is the dierence in the outcome y between the eligible and the ineligible. ITT,
however, is in general not equal to the average treatment eect (ATE), the most popular pa-
rameter in the treatment eect literature. Thus it is useful if we understand the relationship
between ITT and ATE in an operational way. The purpose of this paper is to present such a
relationship in terms of bounds of ATE.
If we are to estimate the mean impact, ITT estimator is given by:
ITT = E[yjz = 1]   E[yjz = 0]:
We denoted E[] as an expectation operator, the eligible with z = 1 and the ineligible with
z = 0. No covariates are included in the above, but they can be introduced in the analysis
without complications.
Following Imbens and Rubin (1997), we classify the subject as: compliers wc, defiers
wd, never-takers wn, and always-takers wa. We assume for simplicity the homogeneity of
individuals among each group. Then we have:
E[yjz = 1] = wcyc1 + wdyd0 + wnyn0 + waya1;
E[yjz = 0] = wcyc0 + wdyd1 + wnyn0 + waya1;
where yi1 is group i’s y with treatment, and yi0 is the outcome y of group i without treatment.
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ITT is:
ITT = wc(yc1   yc0) + wd(yd0   yd1): (1)
The most popular estimator of treatment eect, average treatment eect (ATE), and average
treatment eect on the treated (ATE1) are given by:
AT E = wc(yc1   yc0) + wd(yd1   yd0) + wn(yn1   yn0) + wa(ya1   ya0);
AT E1 = !c(yc1   yc0) + !d(yd1   yd0) + !a(ya1   ya0);
where the weights !i, i = c; d; a are conditional probabilities and are given as:
!c =
wc
q ; !d =
wd
q ; !a =
wa
q ; q = pwc + (1   p)wd + wa:
We can see that ITT is not equal to ATE nor ATE1 in general. ITT will be equal to ATE only
when wc = 1, wi = 0, i = d; n; a.
II Bounding ATE with ITT
We will set the bounds of ATE using ITT. For simplicity, we assume wd = wa = 0,
wn = 1   wc. Denote compliers’ average causal eect (CACE) and noncompliers’ average
causal eect (NACE)*1 as below:
CACE = E[y1   y0ji = c];
NACE = E[y1   y0ji = n]:
Then ITT is:
ITT = E[yjz = 1]   E[yjz = 0];
= wcE[yjz = 1; i = c] + wnE[yjz = 1; i = n]   wcE[yjz = 0; i = c]   wnE[yjz = 0; i = n];
= wcE[y1   y0ji = c];
= wcCACE:
ATE is:
AT E = wcE[y1   y0ji = c] + wnE[y1   y0ji = n] = ITT + wnNACE:
The only unobservable term in the above is E[y1ji = n], the mean counterfactual outcome
of the noncompliers. We will assume that:
NACE 6 CACE: (A1)
Possible justification behind this assumption is that individuals face the uniform opportunity
cost in participation, and the self-selection process can be explained only with the individual
gross benefit or the individual treatment eect y1   y0. Since ATE is a weighted average of
NACE and CACE, it is immediate that:
NACE 6 AT E 6 CACE:
The problem with these bounds is that we cannot observe NACE. So one needs to set the lower
bound on NACE:
NACE > 0: (A2)
*1 They could have been termed as compliers’/noncompliers’ average treatment eect, but we will follow the
convention in the literature.
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Possible justification can be that a lab experiment or other prior belief shows that treatment
can not do any harm in gross outcome. These (A1) and (A2) are fairly weak assumptions.
(A2) implies:
AT E = ITT + wnNACE > ITT:
So we have:
ITT 6 AT E 6 CACE; (2)
or
wcE[y1   y0ji = c] 6 AT E 6 E[y1   y0ji = c]: (3)
Width of the bounds is (1   wc)CACE, thus larger the wc, smaller the width.
III Examples: Microinsurance
III.1 Setup
Suppose that an NGO in India is selling insurance policies to the poor. We would like
estimate the impacts of adverse selection and moral hazard, separately from each other, on
health care utilization y (number of doctor visits). Needless to say, it is important to distin-
guish the two, because they derive from dierent mechanisms that require the dierent sets of
solutions.
The NGO now introduces the new policy and chooses the household randomly to provide
the eligibility to purchase it. All the individuals can buy the existing policy, but only the
randomly chosen eligibles can buy the new policy. We denote the utilization under new policy
as y1, the utilization under the existing policy as y0. For simplicity, we assume that there are
only compliers and noncpompliers. We will estimate the new policy’s net impact on the health
care utilization y over the existing policy.
III.2 Impact on Utilization
Given that there is no randomization for the existing policy, we need to focus only on the
new policy. The impact, in terms of ITT, is given by:
ITT = E[yjz = 1]   E[yjz = 0];
where y denotes the utilization. The impact should be considered as the net of existing policy
availability: the ineligibles are free to purchase the existing policy or not to.
III.3 Moral Hazard
Assume that the new policy uses an experience rating (ER) contract or bonus-malus sys-
tem*2, and other features are identical to the existing policy. Then E[y1   y0] is the dierence
in utilization due to ER. In light of theory, ATE of new policy on the existing policy holders
E[y1   y0je = 1], where e = 1 denotes the indicator of existing policy holder, gives the eects
of ER in reducing moral hazard. This is negative if it does reduce moral hazard. This follows
since an ER policy gives an incentive to suppress utilization, through more intensive preven-
tion eorts (curving ex ante moral hazard) and deterrence of overuse (curving ex post moral
hazard). If it does make a dierence in utilization, it shows that an eort can make a dierence,
satisfying the very definition of moral hazard. ATE on the rest of the eligibles E[y1  y0je = 0],
*2 A contract that discounts the premium if there was no claim, and increases the premium if there was a claim.
3
with the nonholders of existing policy denoted as e = 0, would give the eects of introducing
the new policy on this population, which is most likely to be positive. Thus ATE of new policy
E[y1   y0], which is a weighted average of ATE on the existing policy holders and ATE on the
nonholders, can either be positive or negative.
Allowing for the possibility that there may be eligible households (noncompliers) who
do not prefer the new policy, we can set the bounds to ATE with:
ITT 6 AT E 6 1
wc
ITT: (4)
wc is the percentage of eligible households who purchase the new policy.
III.4 Adverse Selection
Suppose that the new policy is oered at the low premium but with higher deductibles
(or higher copayment). The existing policy is oered at the higher premium but with lower
deductibles (or lower copayment) when compared with the new policy. An ITT estimate of
the new policy is wcE[y1   y0ji = c]. ATE of new policy E[y1   y0] is dierence in utilization
between the group with eligibility to buy the new policy and the group without it.
In theory, ATE of new policy on the existing policy holders E[y1   y0je = 1], where e = 1
denotes the indicator of existing policy holder, gives the eects of high deductibles in reducing
adverse selection. Everything else is the same with the moral hazard example. Note, however,
that they may wind up engaging in moral hazard, after they are insured. So ATE will give the
aggregate eects of both adverse selection and moral hazard. To remove the eect of moral
hazard from this, one needs to incorporate additional randomization (Ito and Kono, 2007). We
will assume that both groups engage to the same extent in moral hazard, so its eect will be
removed after we dierenced ATEs of the two. Bounds are given exactly the same as in (4).
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